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Prioritized Interests: Diverse Lobbying Coalitions
and Congressional Committee Agenda Setting
Geoffrey Miles Lorenz, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Formost congressional legislation, committee consideration is the first andmost drastic winnowing point. Organized interest
groups try to influence this winnowing. Many have suggested such influence arises from organizational resources. I offer an
alternative view based on the need of policy-motivated committee agenda setters to assess the viability of bills before granting
them consideration. Such needs incentivize agenda setters to favor legislation supported by organizations representing diverse
industries, causes, and other interests. Analyzing new data on organizations’ positions on over 4,700 bills introduced between
2005 and 2014, I show that committee consideration favors such “interest diverse” coalitions, not coalitions that are large but
homogeneous or that give high levels of campaign contributions. These associations are stronger when viability information
is more valuable, for majority-party bills and bills introduced during divided government. This suggests that lobbying helps
agenda setters identify, and promote, legislation likely to garner widespread and diverse support.
How do organized interest groups influence lawmak-ing? Members of Congress and lobbyists for orga-nized interest groups are among the most reviled fig-
ures in American life. Both are widely believed to be among
the most unethical and dishonest professions, and there is
widespread public perception that legislators pay too much at-
tention to, and are influenced by, the desires of special interests,
lobbyists, and campaign donors to the exclusion of constit-
uents’ concerns.1 And indeed, interest groups commit sub-
stantial resources and effort to gaining legislators’ attention and
exerting influence. In recent election cycles, interest groups
have given—through political action committees (PACs)—
nearly half a billion dollars to federal campaigns, while spend-
ing over $3 billion per year to employ over 10,000 lobbyists.2
Given the costs groups pay to accrue influence, and Ameri-
cans’ animosity toward that influence, one might assume that
wealthy and well-resourced interests drive Congress’s legis-
lative agenda.
This is not clear from the available evidence. There have
been conflicting findings about whether, or under what con-
ditions, individual interest groups can influence the advance-
ment of bills through the legislative process (Baumgartner and
Leech 1998; Hojnacki et al. 2012). A possible explanation for
these conflicting findings is that individual organizations rarely
have much sway over legislative advancement. Instead, policy
making is influenced when coalitions of organizations lobby
“together” (e.g., Hula 1999) toward a shared objective, par-
ticularly when those coalitions are large (Gilens and Page 2014;
Grossmann and Pyle 2013) or possess high levels of lobbying-
relevant resources such as lobbyists or campaign contributions
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015).
And so, if large or high-resource coalitions have greater leg-
islative influence, those interests may bias lawmaking in their
favor, and animosity toward legislators and lobbyists alike
may be well founded.
In fact, we know little of how interest groups influence con-
gressional agenda setting. Although Schattschneider (1960) ar-
gued that policy agendas were the result of private interests
reframing their conflicts into problems of broad concern, little
subsequent scholarship has investigated this possibility. In-
stead, research on congressional organization emphasizes how
institutionally empowered legislators shape the floor agenda,
particularly in the House (Cox andMcCubbins 2005; Krehbiel
1991; Shepsle and Weingast 1995), and leverage congressional
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institutions—namely, Congress’s standing committees—to serve
their objectives. In focusing exclusively on the needs of dif-
ferent groups of legislators, such research not only discounts
interest group influence but also devalues the stage of the
legislative process where interest groups are most active.
This article examines interest group influence on the leg-
islative agendas of Congress’s standing committees. Although
reforms of the 1970s and 1990s empowered majority-party
leaders at committees’ expense (Sinclair 2011), committees re-
main, for most legislation, the first and most drastic win-
nowing point. In the postreform Congress, committee neglect
has been the proximate cause of death for 82% of all bills
and 77% of majority-party bills.3 Accordingly, interest group
lobbying emphasizes the committee stage. Previous research
has found that lobbying activity is associated with the efforts
of individual committee members (Esterling 2007; Hall and
Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998), with issue areas
emphasized in committee hearings (Leech et al. 2005), and with
bills being considered in committee (Drutman 2010; Gross-
mann and Pyle 2013). These studies link lobbying to com-
mittee politics but cannot discern whether the interest group
coalitions lobbying a congressional committee shape that com-
mittee’s legislative agenda. To the extent that lobbying coali-
tions influence which bills advance or are winnowed out at
the committee stage, they shape Congress’s legislative agenda.
But must a coalition be well resourced or well connected to
be influential?
Beyond being large or wealthy, a lobbying coalition may
also be diverse. In general, diverse coalitions are those whose
members vary in some politically relevant aspect, such as
ideology, organizational style, or issue focus. Such diversity is
the subject of Phinney’s (2017) study of the interest group pol-
itics surrounding Clinton-era welfare reform. In particular,
Phinney examines the conditions giving rise to diverse coali-
tions and finds that the welfare reform bill was more likely
to include policy proposals supported by diverse coalitions.
While diversity may affect legislative formulation, Phinney’s
study cannot discernwhether interest group influence extends
to shaping the larger legislative agenda. Nor is it clear whether
diverse coalitions are more influential than coalitions that are
large but homogeneous or that are generous campaign donors.
Here, I examine whether coalitions with a particular type
of diversity influence which legislative proposals gain com-
mittee consideration. Coalitions vary in the extent to which
their member organizations represent diverse industries, so-
cial causes, and other interests. I theorize that bills supported
by coalitions with higher levels of “interest diversity” are rel-
atively efficient at attracting the sustained support of a critical
mass of rank-and-file legislators. Because such bills are more
likely to continue advancing if granted initial consideration,
the committee agenda setter has incentives to allocate com-
mittee agenda space to bills supported by interest-diverse co-
alitions. To test this expectation, I analyze new data on over
13,000 organizations’ positions on over 4,700 bills introduced
in Congress between 2005 and 2014 (the 109th–113th Con-
gresses). I find that bills supported by coalitions with higher
levels of interest diversity aremore likely to receive committee
consideration. Moreover, this association is stronger among
bills for which the chair has incentives to value information
about legislative viability: those sponsored by majority-party
members or introduced during periods of divided government.
At the same time, I find little association between commit-
tee consideration and lobbying coalitions’ size or their inter-
ests’ PAC contributions. These findings are consistent with
my argument that interest-diverse lobbying coalitions influ-
ence committees’ legislative agendas because that diversity helps
committee agenda setters assess legislative viability.
This article makes several important contributions. First,
it examines interest group influence acrossmany groups, bills,
and issue areas during a period that featured several shifts of
party control in both the legislative and executive branches.
Thus, it offers insights about both lobbying in general and
the interactions between interest group influence and political
institutions. Second, this study expands our understanding
of how lobbying becomes influential. It shows that lobbying
organizations’ identification with unorganized interests out-
side of Washington allows committee agenda setters to use
the organizations lobbying on a bill as an informational cue
to assess the bill’s ability to garner broad, sustained support.
In this sense, interest groups can “inform” agenda setting in
Congress irrespective of the content of their advocacy activity.
Third, this article expands knowledge of the scope of lobby-
ing’s influence on lawmaking. If lobbying’s influence is con-
fined to individual legislators or to the content of individual
bills, it has limited implications for lawmaking; if it can in-
fluence which proposals Congress attends to at all, those im-
plications are that much more sweeping and systemic. How-
ever, these implications may not be entirely malign. Even
though individual groups pursue narrow, parochial concerns,
the systemic impact of lobbying includes a “bias” of congres-
sional agendas toward legislation favored by broad elements
of the American polity, economy, and society.
A PROSPECTIVE VIABILITY THEORY OF COMMITTEE
AGENDA SETTING
Building from several assumptions about legislators and inter-
est group lobbying, I theorize how lobbying on a bill informs
3. Author’s analysis of E. Scott Adler and JohnWilkerson, Congressional
Bills Project (CBP), 1974–2014 (http://www.congressionalbills.org/).
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committee agenda setters’ beliefs about the legislative viability
of that bill. This theory posits a scenario in which policy-
motivated committee chairs must predict the intensity of both
the support and the opposition that different legislative pro-
posals will garner among other legislators. Lobbying helps
chairs make these predictions, by showing them the breadth
of interests with a stake in a bill as well as their support for
or opposition to it. Anticipating how lobbying will mobilize
rank-and-file legislators around different bills, chairs adjust
their agenda-setting decisions.
This theory of interest groups as indicators of legislative vi-
ability rests on several assumptions.4 First, legislators, includ-
ing committee chairs, are motivated by the desire to advance
legislation (Fenno 1973; Kingdon 1989). In addition to serving
their policy goals, pursuing legislative advancement allows leg-
islators to more effectively claim credit with constituents (Hall
1996) and to develop a reputation for legislative effectiveness
that can be a source of influence within their chamber (Volden
and Wiseman 2014). Second, committee chairs have some
discretion in selecting bills for consideration. Indeed, chairs
possess institutional prerogatives that allow them to select the
topics, including bills, of hearings held by their committees
(Oleszek 2011). This allows them, for many proposals in their
committee’s jurisdiction, to advance their personal priorities
in deciding whether to grant bills consideration.5
Third, with respect to particular bills, committee chairs
observe other legislators’ policy preferences and issue prior-
ities with uncertainty. There is a constant crush of issues Con-
gress might deal with and many potential bills to address them.
This makes it difficult for Congress to address problems (Jones
and Baumgartner 2005) and also prevents individual legisla-
tors from developing coherent positions on every issue or bill.
Instead, legislators take positions on most bills only after they
have been granted agenda space (Kingdon 1995). Moreover,
even if legislators had the opportunity develop priorities and
preferenceswith respect to legislation, theywould not necessarily
be able to do so. This is because there is an uncertain connection
between a bill’s provisions and its material and political effects
(Arnold 1990). Indeed, reducing this uncertainty has been ar-
gued (e.g., Krehbiel 1991) to be a function of committee con-
sideration of legislation. In deciding which bills to grant con-
sideration, chairs by definition donot gain the benefits of having
already granted that consideration.
Finally, I assume that interest group lobbying encourages
legislators to invest effort on issues on which the legislator
and interest group agree. This mobilization can result from
many mechanisms: improving legislators’ persuasiveness to
their colleagues (Schnakenberg 2017), connecting legislators
to important district interests (Hansen 1991; Kollman 1998),
or subsidizing legislators’ lawmaking efforts (Esterling 2007;
Hall and Deardorff 2006). This implies that lobbying mobi-
lizes allied legislators to more intensely support or oppose a
bill.
These assumptions in place, a committee chair’s decision-
making can be characterized as the allocation of scarce agenda
space among bills referred to her committee. In doing so, she
will, to the extent possible, grant consideration to bills in such
a way as to maximize her policy gains. In evaluating bills for
this purpose, a chair may face a trade-off between a bill’s value
to her and its viability. Because she has discretion over her
committee’s agenda, she will prefer to allocate committee con-
sideration to bills she prefers to the status quowhile neglecting
bills that she does not. However, because she derives utility
from legislative advancement, her evaluation of a bill will be
conditioned by her predictions regarding that bill’s ability to
advance further, should she grant it consideration. As a result,
a chair should prefer granting consideration to bills that she
prefers to the status quo and that are more likely to pass sub-
sequent stages of the legislative process, all else equal. And,
thus, a bill will be more likely to be granted consideration if
the chair of its committee of referral has reason to believe that it
will be viable in later legislative stages. Given this, forces that
change a chair’s assessment of a bill’s viability also change the
probability that the bill is granted committee consideration in
the first place.
Interest groups and prospective legislative viability
Optimal committee agenda setting would be straightforward
if the chair could observe bill viability perfectly.However, chairs
observe viability with uncertainty. To overcome this uncer-
tainty, chairs look for cues in their political environment
(Krutz 2005; Simon 1985). Lobbying can serve as such a cue,
if chairs can learn about the viability of bills by observing the
organizations lobbying on them.
Lobbying can affect the chair’s perception of a bill’s legis-
lative viability. Viability requires that a bill garner from other
legislators not only support but sustained attention. The bill
must remain a priority, lest other demands on legislators’ time—
from the crush of other policy problems to campaigning and
4. At a more basic level, I assume that (i) committee chairs are rational
actors, (ii) lobbying on a bill is costly to interest groups, and (iii) chairs can
observe which groups are lobbying on a bill before making a decision about
whether to grant that bill consideration.
5. Chairs may incur prohibitive costs for neglecting party priorities and
reauthorization bills. However, party control of a given committee’s agenda is
conditional (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Maltzman 1997), while the volume of
reauthorizations varies by committee and over time (Adler and Wilkerson
2012). To the extent that either predominates, the empirical associations
predicted here should be weaker.
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fund-raising obligations—sweep the bill aside. Because lob-
bying can intensify a legislator’s support for or opposition to a
bill, a lobbying effort able to mobilize many legislators affects
whether a bill has the sustained support necessary to pass.
Because chairs prefer granting consideration to viable bills,
the influence of lobbyists on the intensity of a bill’s support or
opposition informs the chair’s decision to grant the bill
consideration.
At the same time, interest group influence rarely happens
in isolation. Inmost cases,more than one group is lobbying on
a bill at any given time. Groups often compete on legislative
issues (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Holyoke 2011), forming what
Baumgartner et al. (2009) refer to as two lobbying “sides”:
supporters of a policy proposal and opponents of that pro-
posal. Within a side, interest groups may coordinate lobbying
efforts by forming coalitions with one another (Hula 1999).
The construction of coalitions, and by extension sides them-
selves, helps interest groups gain large numbers of allies in
Congress and, through them, policy influence (Mahoney and
Baumgartner 2015). Thus, the factors that allow the groups
on one side of a bill to intensify many legislators’ support also
make those groups more influential over committee chairs’
agenda-setting decisions.
The electoral connection, interest diversity,
and legislative viability
Interest groups help legislators connect their lawmaking ac-
tivities to their reelection. Legislators seek reelection (Kingdon
1989; Mayhew 1974), but not by appealing to their median
voter. Instead, they build support among a collection of indus-
tries, ethnic- or other identity-based communities, and other
“subconstituencies” salient to their district’s voters (Bishin 2009;
Fenno 1978). These subconstituencies have distinct issue pri-
orities and policy preferences, which their representatives
benefit from pursuing (Hall 1996; Sulkin 2005). However,
subconstituencies do not necessarily communicate their
preferences on particular bills. Instead, legislators must infer
these, either by investing scarce time and effort or by relying
on a legislatively active proxy for their district interests.
This proxy role is served by interest groups. By definition,
organized interest groups represent an industry, demographic
group, social cause, or other shared interest; they also monitor
legislation and suggest policy proposals their members will
prioritize. Thus, legislators use groups as proxies for broader
societal or economic interests (Grossmann 2012b) and grant
access to groups that represent key district interests (Hansen
1991; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). However, each group can
only appeal to a subset of legislators this way: those whose
reelection prospects rely on the subconstituencies that the
group represents. Thus, most interest groups cannot influence
committee chairs’ legislative agenda-setting decisions through
the subconstituencies they represent. A lobbying side can over-
come this limitation, if its members represent many different
subconstituencies. Such coalitions’ members may be elector-
ally relevant to, and hence better able to gain access to, more
legislators.
In addition to gaining access to more legislators, coalitions
whose members represent many subconstituencies are also
diverse. Coalitions can be diverse in many ways, for example,
in their members’ ideological or partisan identities, organi-
zational styles, or preferred advocacy tactics. Phinney (2017),
in the most thorough treatment of coalition diversity to date,
argues that diverse coalitions are more likely to arise around
a policy proposal that gains elite-level salience, faces strong
opposition, or has uncertain policy consequences. Moreover,
Tattersall (2013) and Phinney both argue that fostering coa-
lition diversity can remit organizational benefits to a group, by
introducing it to new ideas, innovative advocacy strategies,
and a broader set of potential future group leaders. Thus,
coalitions have both extrinsic and intrinsic incentives to foster
their diversity. In addition, coalitions gain influence by pro-
moting their diversity. Drawing on a signaling model, Phin-
ney (2017) argues that legislators find diverse coalitions’ sig-
nals about policy proposals more credible, for at least three
reasons. First, diverse coalitions synergize their members’ ad-
vocacy tactics and organizational networks. Second, they send
a more heterogeneous signal to legislators about the quality
of a legislative proposal. Third, diverse coalitions are harder
to maintain, making their legislative signals costlier. Thus,
legislators have reason to believe that bills favored by diverse
coalitions are more deserving of their attention and support
than those favored by homogeneous coalitions, all else equal.
Interest-diverse coalitions combine the access-gaining
benefits of subconstituency relevance with the heterogeneous
signaling of diverse coalitions. I define a lobbying side’s in-
terest diversity as the degree of variety in distinct subcon-
stituencies represented among its member organizations. For
example, consider two sides of a hypothetical health care
bill: one side consists of three pharmaceutical companies; the
other consists of one doctors’ association, one health insur-
ance carrier, and one patient advocacy group. While the two
sides are of equal size—three organizations each—the second
side is more interest diverse because the interests its members
represent are more distinct from one another. Interest-diverse
coalitions are more likely to include members representing
important reelection subconstituencies for a given legislator.
Hence, they should be better able to gain access to legislators
than a homogeneous coalition, all else equal. At the same
time, because their diversity is observable and relevant to a
given legislator, they will send more credible signals about
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the quality of a given bill; these signals will better mobilize that
legislator to actively support or oppose the bill.
Coalition interest diversity may inform committee chairs’
agenda-setting decisions. If an interest-diverse coalition has
formed on one side of a bill, legislators will observe that di-
versity and infer that the bill is not only good (or bad) but
relevant to them. Thus, interest-diverse coalitions will mobi-
lize legislators’ support for or opposition to a bill more ef-
fectively than less diverse coalitions, all else equal. Moreover,
because lobbying efforts tend to focus on the committee stage
(Drutman 2010; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998), interest diver-
sity can be observed by committee chairs before making their
agenda-setting decisions. These qualities make interest diver-
sity a useful heuristic for chairs in predicting the legislative
viability of bills. If a bill’s supporters are more interest diverse
than its opponents, chairs have reason to believe that the bill
will garner more support than opposition from legislators in
the future. Likewise, if a bill’s opponents are more interest
diverse than its supporters, the bill may prove less viable.
Hence, the balance of interest diversity across the two sides of
a bill is a heuristic chairs can use to assess legislative viability. I
expect that they will adapt their agenda-setting decisions in
response to the interest diversity of the lobbying coalitions
arrayed on that bill.
H1. To the extent that the set of interest groups sup-
porting a bill is higher in interest diversity than that
opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted
committee consideration.
Alternative sources of interest group influence
Although this article focuses on interest diversity as a source
of interest group influence, prior research has identified two
other important coalition attributes that may be sources of
legislative influence. These sources are campaign contribu-
tions and organizational numbers. While the prospective
viability theory posited here is agnostic as to the influence of
contributions and side size themselves on committee con-
sideration, either attribute may potentially confound the
relationship between interest diversity and committee con-
sideration. Thus, they are the subject of alternative hypoth-
eses that this article will test.
Campaign contributions. One of the most common con-
cerns about organized interests is their ability to direct money
to legislators’ campaigns. Campaign contributions can incen-
tivize legislators to get involved in issues (Esterling 2007; Hall
and Wayman 1990), to grant access (Fouirnaies 2018; Kalla
and Broockman 2016; Powell and Grimmer 2016), to intro-
duce legislation (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999), and to
vote in accordance with a donor’s preferences (Denzau and
Munger 1986; Stratmann 1998). However, these individual-
level changes do not often lead to increased legislative via-
bility. Indeed, recent research by Mahoney and Baumgartner
(2015) suggests that individual organizations’ resources (in-
cluding PACs) are not associated with the building of legis-
lative support for a lobbying side; instead it is the total accu-
mulation of resources among interests across the two sides of
a bill that garners legislative support to one side or the other.
Nevertheless, a bill’s viability may be buttressed if supporting
interests’ campaign contributions outweigh opponents’ or un-
dermined if opponents’ contributions outweigh supporters’.
H2. To the extent the set of interest groups support-
ing a bill has higher levels of campaign contributions
than that opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be
granted committee consideration.
Campaign contributions are prevalent in congressional
politics, but it is unclear that this affords influence over bills’
committee consideration. PAC contributions appear moti-
vated by individual-level goals: buying access to key incum-
bents, rewarding voting behavior, and supporting the reelec-
tion of ideological allies. An impact of this individual-level
influence on committee agendas is not automatic. Contribu-
tions may accrue access, but it is unclear what chairs can
learn about the viability of a bill using the contributions of or-
ganizations aligned for or against it or whether chairs observe
campaign contribution levels from lobbying organizations the
way they observe the interests those organizations represent (see
Drutman 2010, 835). Thus, there is reason to doubt that PAC
contributions affect committee agenda-setting decisions.
Side size. Alignment of interest groups across lobbying sides
may influence whether a policy change is adopted. Gilens and
Page (2014) find that the balance of interest group alignments
between those supporting and those opposing a policy change
is an important predictor of policy adoption, even when con-
trolling for the preferences of middle-income citizens and
economic elites. Legislators often know which organizations
they tend to agree with on policy matters and may follow
signals from them (Kingdon 1989). Having a large number of
organizations on one side might indicate that side’s collective
clout or ability to persuade legislators to their cause. Thus,
larger sides may be more likely to prevail.
H3. To the extent that the set of interest groups sup-
porting a bill has more organizations than that oppos-
ing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted com-
mittee consideration
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However, there are at least two reasons to doubt that sheer
numbers make a lobbying side effective. First, groups vary
substantially in their access to a given legislator; in particular,
legislators prefer to grant access to interests that share their
policy preferences or represent district interests (Bauer, Pool,
and Dexter 1964; Hansen 1991). A side can be large, but if its
members can only access a few legislators then its influence
may be limited. Second, coalition work is costly for individ-
ual coalition members (Hojnacki 1997). It would be coun-
terproductive to coordinate a coalition among groups on a
side unless that coordination provided benefits beyond what
themembers could accomplish on their own. Thus, large sides
may be influential, but that influence should accrue from
factors other than their size itself.
While I have argued for an informational rationale for in-
terest group influence on committee agenda setting, partisan
and distributive considerations may also play a role. Partisan
theories of legislative organization (Aldrich and Rohde 2001;
Cox andMcCubbins 2005)make no explicit predictions about
the role of interest groups in legislative agenda setting. In-
stead, they emphasize the role of majority-party leaders in
shaping Congress’s legislative agenda to reflect their caucus’s
policy consensus (or lack thereof). This suggests that the key
source of viability for a bill is the consensus around it within
the majority party. Insofar as this consensus can be affected
by interest-diverse lobbying coalitions, partisan theories would
predict hypothesis 1. For their part, distributive theories (Adler
and Lapinski 1997; Weingast and Marshall 1988) emphasize
how Congress resolves the differing priorities of its members.
In this framework, members join those committees with ju-
risdiction over programs their constituencies care aboutmost,
then ensure that each legislator secures policies preferred by
his or her own, homogeneous, “high demanders” (cf. Wein-
gast and Marshall 1988) by logrolling across committees. The
key feature of this logrolling is that members not on a com-
mittee defer to the preferences of the members of the com-
mittee on programs within a committee’s jurisdiction. Thus,
under a distributive model, downstream viability is not a con-
cern for committee agenda setters, and appealing to diverse
interests is unnecessary; distributive theories would not predict
hypothesis 1. Moreover, if agenda setters care only about the
“high demanders” relevant to their committees, bills supported
by lobbying coalitions with lower levels of interest diversity
might be more likely to gain committee consideration; thus,
distributive theories might predict the opposite of hypothe-
sis 1. Although the purpose of this article is not to adjudi-
cate between theories of legislative organization, my empirical
strategy permits consideration of informational, distributive,
and partisan mechanisms of interest group influence.
NEW DATA ON INTEREST GROUPS’ BILL
POSITIONS, 2005–14
To assess how committee consideration is shaped by interest
groups, I collect new data on each. To capture committee con-
sideration of bills, I use data from the Congressional Bills Project
(CBP) and the legislative-tracking website Govtrack. I also use
Govtrack, the CBP, as well as data from the Comparative
Agendas Project (CAP), for various control variables in the
model estimates reported below. Summary statistics for all
variables used in this analysis are presented in the appendix,
available online.
Critically, I require data on interest groups’ bill positions.
Neither common source of lobbying data has such informa-
tion for large numbers of bills. Many lobbying studies (e.g.,
Grossmann and Pyle 2013; Leech et al. 2005) rely on data
gleaned from reports filed by lobbying organizations under
the Lobby Disclosure Act (LDA). LDA reports specify issues,
and sometimes bills, on which an organization lobbied. How-
ever, LDA reports rarely contain information about registrants’
positions on particular bills; thus, they cannot test this arti-
cle’s empirical expectations. The other common data source
is to interview or survey lobbyists (e.g., Baumgartner et al.
2009). Interviews can glean rich detail about groups’ legis-
lative activities but are limited in two ways. First, the cost
of conducting interviews often means that interview-based
studies cover a small number of issue areas (see Baumgartner
and Leech 1998). Second, lobbyists’ perceptions color their
explanations for phenomena, such as committee consider-
ation, outside of their direct control. Thus, I can rely on nei-
ther LDA reports nor interviews for present purposes.
Instead, I collected new data on organizations’ positions on
congressional legislation. The nonprofit, nonpartisan organi-
zation Maplight documents public positions taken by interest
groups, advocacy groups, institutions, and firms on specific
bills, beginning in the 109th Congress (2005–6).6 Maplight re-
searchers examine news stories, blogs, websites, as well as letters
sent by organizations to members of Congress. As of February
2016, Maplight had documented 67,827 positions (supporting,
opposing, or not applicable [NA]) taken by 13,603 organizations
on 5,390 bills introduced during the 109th–113th Congresses.7 I
collected these data using Maplight’s application programming
interface (API).
6. Previous research uses Maplight data on individual bills (Galantucci
2015; Laposata, Kennedy, and Glantz 2014; Moore, Powell, and Reeves 2013).
This article uses Maplight’s entire data set.
7. In the analyses reported below, I treat positions of NA as an indication
of interest in the bill, and so groups with NA positions are included in the
interest group salience measure but no other variable.
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Beyond the bill positions themselves, this analysis requires
information on the interests a given group represents. For both,
I rely on a taxonomy developed by the Center for Responsive
Politics (CRP). The taxonomy includes over 400 interest group
categories, allowing for nuanced distinctions between interests
of different types.8 Maplight applies these interest group cate-
gories to each organization taking a position on a particular
bill, according to the particular organization’s reasons for
lobbying the bill.9 For these interests’ campaign contribution
levels, I collected Federal Election Commission data compiled
by the CRP itself; CRP uses its taxonomy for categorizing cam-
paign contributions.10 Merging across these data sets results
in a combined data set of 4,757 regular House and Senate
bills from the 109th to 113th Congresses for which Maplight
has documented at least one interest group position and the
CRP has collected relevant campaign finance information.11
The bills analyzed here are a large set of “newsworthy” bills
but not a random sample of bills. One criterion for news-
worthiness is legislative advancement.12 As a result, Maplight
data exhibit some selection on this study’s dependent vari-
able, committee consideration. Indeed, the CBP reports that
although only 7% of bills in the 109th–113th Congresses re-
ceived consideration in committee in their chamber of origin,
about 30% of Maplight bills from the same time period were
reported from committee. Sample selection procedures that,
like Maplight’s, are correlated with a dependent variable tend
to attenuate causal effect estimates (King, Keohane, andVerba
1994). Thus, the true effects of interest group lobbying side
attributes may be larger than reported here.
The dependent variable: Committee consideration
My theory concerns the allocation of consideration to bills
in committee. By default, committee consideration has three
stages: first, a hearing, which features testimony about the bill
fromwitnesses (often, federal bureaucrats and representatives
of firms or industries likely to be affected by the proposal in
question); second, a markup, in which committee members
develop a specific bill, through amendments to an initial pro-
posal; third, a vote on whether to report the bill to the full
chamber (Oleszek 2011). I focus on markups and reports.
Granting a markup implies that a chair has settled on a spe-
cific bill, and any members (including the chair) who wish to
amend the bill must put effort into developing those amend-
ments (Evans 2001; Hall 1996). Hearings, by contrast, are of-
ten loosely tied to specific bills, but even when they are tightly
connected, the viability of the bill being “heard” is not as im-
portant as drawing committee members’ attention to it (King-
don 1995). Thus,markup and reporting are the earliest definitive
indications that a specific bill has been granted agenda space. To
determine which bills have received consideration, I used web
scraping to gather records of bills’ legislative progress from
Govtrack. For each bill, if any full committee in the bill’s chamber
of origin marked up or reported the bill, I recorded it as having
received Markup or Reporting and use this as the dependent
variable in the models reported below. In the appendix, I show
that the results presented here are robust to alternative measures
of committee consideration.
Independent variables
Lobbying side attributes. To test the hypotheses outlined
above, I measure three attributes of the interest group sides on
each bill. These attributes are a side’s interest diversity, cam-
paign contributions, and size.13
Hypothesis 1: Net interest diversity (meanp 3.2, SDp 8.9).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the balance of interest diversity across
bill sides should be associated with committee consideration.
8. The taxonomy organizes interests at three levels: sectors (e.g., Health-
care vs. Defense), industries (e.g., Public Sector Unions vs. Transportation
Unions, within the Labor sector), and interest group categories (e.g., Foreign
PolicyHawks vs. Foreign PolicyDoves, within the Foreign andDefense Policy
industry, within the Ideology/Single Issue sector). For more information
about these codes, see CRP’s website: https://www.opensecrets.org/industries
/slist.php (accessed August 27, 2017).
9. More information can be found on Maplight’s API page: https://
maplight.org/data_guide/bill-positions-api/ (accessed April 20, 2018).
10. For more information on the CRP methodology for categorizing
contributions, see https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/methodology.php
(accessed August 27, 2017).
11. I exclude from this analysis both reauthorization and appropriations
bills. Lobbying on such bills is less focused on affecting its passage than on
securing amendments to a program’s funding levels or statutory authoriza-
tion. To identify appropriations bills, I follow Grossmann and Pyle (2013)
and find bills whose titles include any of the following strings: “making ap-
propriations,” “making supplemental appropriations,” “emergency supplemental
appropriations,” “making miscellaneous appropriations,” and “supplemental ap-
propriations.” Reauthorization bills were identified as those including the string
“reauthoriz” in their extended titles. This study’s findings are robust to including
both types of bills.
12. Maplight describes its process for selecting bills for research as fol-
lows: “We gather this data for newsworthy bills: bills that move forward in
Congress or that are mentioned in the news or blogs. We do not research . . .
ceremonial bills (such as naming post offices)” (http://maplight.org/us-con
gress/guide/data/support-opposition, accessed March 28, 2016).
13. Although the current analysis relies on difference measures between
sides’ attributes, an analysis breaking these attributes down by side might
prove insightful about whether particular attributes work better for bill-
supporting or bill-opposing sides. Such an analysis entails complex collin-
earity and more subtle issues that are beyond the scope of this article to ad-
dress. Hence, I leave it to future work.
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To measure interest diversity, I use the CRP interest group
categories assigned to each organization lobbying on a bill. I
measure a side’s interest diversity as the number of unique
such categories among organizations on that side. To return
to the earlier example, a side composed of three pharmaceu-
tical companies would have an interest diversity score of 1,
while a side composed of one doctors’ association, one health
insurance carrier, and one patient advocacy group would have
an interest diversity score of 3. To measure the balance of
interest diversity between a bill’s supporting organizations and
its opposing organizations, I subtract the latter from the for-
mer; this produces a Net Interest Diversity score.
Hypothesis 2: Net campaign contributions—$2,675,000
increments (meanp 3.3, SDp 14.3).Hypothesis 2 predicts
that the balance of campaign contributions across bill sides
is associated with committee consideration. I measure cam-
paign contributions at the level of the interest category rather
than at the organization level. While doing so imposes lim-
itations,14 measuring at the interest level accounts for two
common features of PAC contribution strategy: first, that
legislators appear to be less responsive to individual organi-
zations than to the overall landscape of resources marshaled
around an issue (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015); second,
that many organizations do not have their own PACs but
instead give indirectly (e.g., through their trade associations).
Thus, for each bill, I identify the CRP category code of each
organization lobbying on that bill (as for Net Interest Diver-
sity) and use CRP campaign finance records to identify the
total value of contributions made by PACs in the same cate-
gory during the cycle in which the bill was introduced. I total
these categories’ contributions on each side,15 then subtract
the opposing interests’ contributions from the supporters’ con-
tributions. Thus, negative values of this variable indicate that
opposing interests gave more contributions than supporting
interests. I scale the variable in increments of $2,675,000, the
number of voting members of Congress (535) multiplied by
the maximum allowable PAC contribution to a candidate per
cycle ($5,000). Thus, a one-unit increase in this variable is
equivalent to one additional organization supporting a bill
giving the maximum contribution to every member of Con-
gress.16 Thus, at this scale, any association between campaign
contributions and committee consideration should be large
in magnitude.
Hypothesis 3: Net side size (mean p 6.2, SD p 21.7).
Hypothesis 3 holds that when one side is composed of more
organizations than another, the side with more organizations
lobbying is expected to win. This variable is the number of or-
ganizations supporting the bill minus the number opposing it.
Controls
Coalition diversity is not random across proposals. Phinney
(2017) finds that coalition diversity is more likely to arise in
certain political contexts. These include (1) when a bill is sa-
lient to policy elites (i.e., lawmakers and interest groups) and
(2) when a side has a strong opponent but the sides are still
close enough that a new member on either side might tip the
balance.17 If these factors are also associated with committee
consideration, they are potential confounds to any estimated
relationship between diversity and consideration. I control for
these using the Maplight data. To measure Interest Group
Salience (mean p 12.5, SD p 25.8), I sum the number of
organizations taking any position on the bill. I measure a bill’s
Legislative Salience (mean p 30.7, SD p 50.3) as its total
number of cosponsors. Finally, I compare the sides’ sizes to
measure the bill’s Interest Group Competitiveness (2Fno. of
supporters2 no. of opponentsF; meanp29.4, SDp 20.5).
Specifically, I subtract the number of opponents from the
number of supporters, take the absolute value of that differ-
ence, and then multiply that absolute value by 21. The re-
sulting quantity is a nonpositive number that captures how
closely sized the two sides are; as the numbers of supporters
and opponents converge, it approaches zero.
There are also common institution- and sponsor-level fac-
tors that make a bill more likely to receive committee con-
sideration. As strategic, close observers of legislative politics,
lobbyists are likely to understand these factors and direct
lobbying toward bills that are more likely to make legislative
progress. I include indicators of whether sponsors were a
14. Because not all organizations in an interest category lobby on any
given bill, this may include irrelevant PAC contributions. However, this
overcounting is likely balanced out across a bill’s sides. Thus, the interest-level
measure captures much of the same variation as would an organization-
level measure.
15. This potential multicounting addresses instances in which organi-
zations in the same category lobby on opposite bill sides. The net effect of that
code’s contributions is weighted by the balance of organizations with that
code on each side.
16. CRP reports that only four organizations gave this much in the
2013–14 cycle. See https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/index.php?cyclep2014
&partypA (accessed April 12, 2018).
17. Phinney also finds that a proposal’s policy uncertainty encourages
coalition diversity, but there is no standard measure for uncertainty. The
best available proxy is introduction timing; bills introduced earlier in a
Congress are more likely to be carried over from previous Congresses and
therefore may be better understood. The results reported below are robust
to controlling for bill introduction timing.
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Majority Party Member of their chamber, a Committee Mem-
ber, a Majority Party Committee Member (i.e., an interaction
effect of Majority Party and Committee Member), or the Com-
mittee Chair for the bill’s committee of referral, as well as
whether the bill was introduced during a period of Unified Gov-
ernment. A bill’s Issue Area is indicated using its CAP major
topic code, and its Congress is that in which it was introduced.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
How does interest diversity influence committee agenda set-
ting? To address this question, I model whether each bill re-
ceived committee consideration in its chamber of origin as
a function of the Net Interest Diversity of the organizations
lobbying on the bill, as well as the those organizations’ Net
Side Size, and the Net PACContributions of the interests they
represent. I embed this model within a simple regression frame-
work. My measure of committee consideration is a binary
indicator. Also, there are likely both time-invariant charac-
teristics of legislative issue areas as well as common shocks
affecting all bills in a given Congress. To account for these, I
employ mixed effects logistic regressions, with Congress fixed
effects and major topic code random intercepts.18
Without exogenous variation in Net Interest Diversity, I can-
not eliminate endogeneity bias in my model estimates. How-
ever, I can examine whether committee consideration pat-
terns are more consistent with my argument that interest
diversity serves as a heuristic for legislative viability than with
other explanations of interest group influence. To do so, I
proceed in two steps. First, I examine whether committee con-
sideration is more strongly associated with Net Interest Diver-
sity than with Net Side Size or Net PAC Contributions, which
operationalize the most common alternative expectations of
interest group influence. Second, I demonstrate that the rela-
tionships between these lobbying side attributes and com-
mittee consideration are nonlinear in ways that my theory
explains but alternative theories cannot. Specifically, I exam-
ine how coefficient estimates on lobbying side attribute vari-
ables change for bills with more ambiguous, if not necessarily
lower, legislative viability—those introduced by majority-
party sponsors or during periods of nonunified government.
If these estimates are higher formajority- thanminority-party
bills and higher for bills introduced in divided vis-à-vis unified
government, it would be consistent with the theory that in-
terest groups influence committee agenda setting by influ-
encing agenda setters’ perceptions of bills’ likelihood of fur-
ther legislative advancement.
RESULTS: COMMITTEE AGENDAS FAVOR BILLS
SUPPORTED BY DIVERSE INTERESTS
The model estimates for the lobbying side attribute variables
are depicted in figure 1 and fully reported in the appendix.
The figure presents the estimated coefficients of four mixed
effects logistic regression models for which the outcome vari-
able is committee consideration (markup or reporting). Model 1
(point estimates drawn as circles in fig. 1), the base model,
regresses consideration on the lobbying coalition attributes
(Net Interest Diversity, Net PAC Contributions, and Net Side
Size), an indicator for the sponsor being in the majority party,
Congress (period) fixed effects, and CAP major topic code
random intercepts. Model 2 (diamonds) also includes controls
for factors that encourage diverse lobbying coalitions: interest
group salience, legislative salience, and interest group compet-
itiveness. Model 3 (squares) contains lobbying coalition attri-
butes, a majority-party indicator, Congress fixed effects, major
topic code random intercepts, and controls for other factors
that increase committee consideration: committee member-
ship, the interaction of committee membership andmajority-
party status, committee chair sponsor, and unified government.
Model 4 (triangles) is the full model specification, including all
controls. Results with respect to Net Interest Diversity and
Net Side Size are consistent across all four models; Net PAC
Contributions’ coefficient point estimates are positive across
all models, although not statistically significant in the full
specification. Thus, while subsequent discussion characterizes
all models, I focus on the full model specification (model 4).
Net Interest Diversity is positively associated with commit-
tee agenda setting. Across all models, its coefficient is posi-
tive and its 95% confidence interval excludes zero. Thus, high
interest diversity among a bill’s supporters (relative to its op-
ponents) is associated with committee consideration. Figure 2
displays the predicted probability of committee consideration
(markup or reporting), the full model specification, over the
range of Net Interest Diversity, with other variables at their
means. A shift from 1 standard deviation below mean Net
Interest Diversity to 1 standard deviation above the mean is
associated with a 9.3 percentage point increase in the proba-
bility that the bill will be granted some form of committee con-
sideration. Given that—all else equal—a given bill only has a 30%
chance of gaining committee consideration, this is a substantively
significant improvement. This suggests that committee agenda
setters prefer to grant consideration to bills that are supported by
a diverse range of industries, social causes, and other interests.
Contrary to much discourse on money in politics, the di-
rect impact of campaign contributions on committee agendas
18. Although guidelines fromClark and Linzer (2015) and Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal (2012) support this modeling strategy, I report, in the appen-
dix, model estimates making a variety of assumptions about error structure.
All model estimates lead to the same substantive conclusions.
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appears to be positive but inconsistent and substantively neg-
ligible. The coefficient on Net PAC Contributions is statisti-
cally significant in all the models depicted in figure 1 except
the full model specification (model 4). Figure 2 displays the
predicted probability of committee consideration (markup
or reporting), in model 4 of figure 1, over the range of values
of Net PAC Contributions. It depicts a weak relationship be-
tween Net PAC Contributions and committee consideration,
although its degree of statistical significance (or lack thereof)
varies by model specification, the coefficient on Net PAC
Contributions is very small regardless. This result is particu-
larly surprising given that each one-unit increase in Net PAC
Contributions represents giving the maximum annual single-
PAC contribution to every member of Congress. Given this
scale, if campaign contributions had the dominant agenda-
buying power often attributed to them, we would expect to
find an effect both more robust and much larger.
Also contrary to expectations, Net Side Size is negatively
associated with committee consideration. Across all models,
the coefficient of Net Side Size is negative and statistically
significant. Figure 2 displays the marginal predicted proba-
bility over the range ofNet Side Size (all other variables at their
means), for model 4 of figure 1. A shift in Net Side Size from
1 standard deviation below the mean to 1 standard deviation
above the mean is associated with a 10.8 percentage point
decrease in the probability that a bill received committee
consideration. This complicates interpretation of the mar-
ginal effect of Net Interest Diversity, because a coalitionwould
presumably increase diversity by adding new members. How-
ever, given that a 1 standard deviation shift in Net Interest
Diversity is 8.9 interest group categories, while a standard
deviation shift in Net Side Size is 21.9 organizations, a side can
add meaningful diversity without adding much counterpro-
ductive size.
Regardless, the negative coefficient on Net Side Size is
counterintuitive. However, the theory advanced here is ame-
nable to a finding that the coefficient on Net Side Size is small
or nonpositive. The theory contends that interest groups’
Figure 2. Effect of lobbying side attributes on predicted probability of consideration. Predicted probability (solid line), with 95% confidence intervals (dashed),
of committee consideration across the range of each attribute with other variables at their means, from model 4 of figure 1.
Figure 1. Lobbying side attributes and committee consideration across four model specifications. Point estimates (with 95% confidence intervals represented by
horizontal lines) for coefficients of interest from the four mixed effects logit models of committee consideration. Coefficients from a given model share their
point estimate marker’s shape. Model 1 (circle), the base model, contains the lobbying coalition attributes, a majority-party indicator, Congress fixed effects, and
issue area random intercepts.Model 2 (diamond) adds controls for factors that encourage interest group diversity. Model 3 (square) adds to the basemodel controls
for factors that encourage committee consideration. Model 4 (triangle) is the full model specification. See full results table in the appendix.
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influence is a product of their heuristic value to the agenda
setter. If so, and a coalition is homogenous, the marginal in-
formational value of, and influence gained from, each coali-
tion member is minimal. Moreover, other research (e.g., Hoj-
nacki 1997) finds that coalitions require resource investments
from coalition members. These investments might make co-
alition members, in aggregate, less effective than if they had
been directed toward additional noncoalition lobbying. Thus,
there is theoretical justification to anticipate that coalitions
may not be productive if they are not more than the sum of
their members. A nonpositive coefficient on Net Side Size,
therefore, is less surprising than it may seem at first. When
examining Net Side Size without Net Interest Diversity (see
the appendix), it appears that the effect of Net Side Size is
statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests either
that the effect of side size by itself is indeed null or else that
side size is counterproductive unless new coalition members
contribute something else to a coalition.
Finally, as I report in the appendix, results with respect to
other controls are consistent with prior work. Majority-party
status, committee membership, the interaction thereof, com-
mittee chairmanship, and unified government are all positively
associated with committee consideration. The coefficient on
Number of Cosponsors is small and likely attributable to
chance, as in prior research. As expected, the coefficients on
Number of Groups Lobbying and Interest Group Competi-
tiveness are positive and unlikely due to chance. Like Net Side
Size, however, these variables are functions of the number of
groups lobbying for or against a bill. For models that include
all three measures, the coefficients on these three variables
imply that the addition of one group supporting a bill may be
associated with either an increase or a decrease in the proba-
bility of committee consideration, depending on baseline Net
Side Size.19 These intricacies notwithstanding, the results with
respect to control variables suggest that Maplight bills are
representative of congressional legislation.
Taken together, these results suggest that interest groups
play a role in committee agenda setting. In particular, com-
mittee consideration of a bill is associated with an interest-
diverse coalition supporting that bill; coalitions that are large,
or that are generous campaign donors, are not found to be
substantively associated with committee consideration. Thus,
hypothesis 1 finds support, while hypotheses 2 and 3 find lit-
tle. This finding is consistent with the argument that lobbying
influences committee agendas by providing the agenda setter
with information about various bills before their committee.
Moreover, these results partially clarify how legislative or-
ganization interacts with interest group influence. First, these
results militate against a purely distributional mechanism for
interest group influence. Under a distributive model, logroll-
ing across committees obviates the need for individual bills
to have broad appeal, instead catering to the narrow, parochial
concerns of the members of committees to which those bills
are referred. The positive and substantively significant coef-
ficient onNet Interest Diversity suggests that logrolling across
bills does not compensate for a lack of broad appeal in an
individual bill. Alternatively, perhaps the logrolling on which
distributive models depend occurs within bills rather than
between them; if such bills are designed to appeal to many
different constituencies, it could be the case that a bill is ap-
pealing to diverse lobbying coalitions as a by-product of knit-
ting together the priorities of many different types of districts.
To examine whether this possibility creates a spurious correla-
tion between Net Interest Diversity and committee consider-
ation, I consider a class of bills for which high-demand con-
stituencies are most likely to affect legislative viability: bills
relevant to many districts and thus capable of mobilizing
many legislators. All else equal, bills will be relevant to more
districts to the extent they touch on more substantive topic
areas. If distributive considerations create a spurious associ-
ation between interest-diverse lobbying coalitions and com-
mittee consideration, we should be able to mitigate the esti-
mated association between them by controlling for bills’ issue
coverage. As I report in the appendix, the association between
Net Interest Diversity and Committee Consideration is ro-
bust to controlling for the issue breadth of legislation. Thus,
it is unlikely that a distributional theory alone can explain the
apparent influence of interest-diverse lobbying coalitions.
However, findings consistent with hypothesis 1 can be ex-
plained by partisan agenda setting. Under a partisan model,
majority-party leaders look toward consensus within their
caucus to drive their agenda-setting decisions. This may op-
erate in two ways. First, majority leaders may block legisla-
tion controversial within their caucus (Cox and McCubbins
2005). To the extent that interest-diverse lobbying coalitions
might foster or prevent such controversy, bills supported by
them may be more likely to pass partisan muster. Thus, par-
tisan theories can explain findings consistent with hypothe-
sis 1. But, conditional party government theories (Aldrich and
Rohde 2001) suggest that parties use agenda-setting powers
to bypass committees and guarantee floor consideration to
bills when their caucus has achieved consensus on them. If
interest-diverse lobbying coalitions foster intraparty consen-
sus on legislation, we should expect that bills supported by an
19. If baseline Net Side Size is negative, one additional supporter will
also increase Competitiveness, and the sum of the coefficients on Net Side
Size (20.016), Number of Groups Lobbying (0.022), and Competitiveness
(0.018) will be positive (0.024). If baseline Net Side Size is nonnegative,
adding one supporter will decrease Competitiveness, and the sum of the
coefficients will be negative (20.012).
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interest-diverse lobbying coalition are more likely to be se-
lected from among other legislation introduced by members
of the majority party to bypass committees and proceed di-
rectly to floor consideration. As I report in the appendix, I find
no differences in lobbying coalition attributes between such
committee-bypassing bills and other bills introduced by
majority-party members. This suggests that, if interest group
coalitions influence majority-party leadership’s decision-making,
they do so in some way other than through parties’ use of pos-
itive agenda power.
Although these initial results are novel, they do not yet
evince this study’s theory: that the chair’s need to assess legis-
lative viability generates conditions under which interest groups
can be influential on committee agenda setting. Showing that
distributional and partisan concerns do not appear to explain
interest group influence is not sufficient to show that infor-
mational considerations do explain interest group influence.
To further investigate this, I turn next to the role of institu-
tional alignments and majority-party advantages in condi-
tioning interest group influence.
INTEREST DIVERSITY IS MORE INFLUENTIAL
FOR BILLS WITH AMBIGUOUS VIABILITY
Here, I test whether the influence of interest diversity changes
with the chair’s prior beliefs about the viability of a bill. I as-
sume that when a chair believes that a bill’s viability is am-
biguous (i.e., further advancement is neither certain nor im-
possible) she will give greater weight to external sources of
information about that viability in deciding whether to grant
consideration to the bill. If lobbying coalition interest diversity
constitutes such information, it should therefore be more
influential on a chair’s consideration-granting decisions with
respect to bills of ambiguous viability than bills for which
viability is clearly high or low. This, in turn, suggests non-
linearity in the association between interest diversity and com-
mittee consideration; it should be stronger for bills when via-
bility is, a priori, more ambiguous. If this expectation holds, it
is consistent with my theory’s contention that the chair’s need
to anticipate legislative viability creates conditions for interest
group influence.
I focus on two factors that make bills’ legislative viability
more ambiguous. First, the party status of the bill’s sponsor. In
the modern Congress, the majority party has strong agenda-
setting powers in both chambers (Cox and McCubbins 2005;
Den Hartog and Monroe 2011). Indeed, majority-party bills
are much more likely to gain committee consideration than
minority-party bills. However, majority sponsorship alone is
insufficient to secure committee consideration: in fact, only
about a third of majority-sponsored bills (1,249 out of 3,515)
in theMaplight data received committee consideration. Thus,
while the viability of minority-sponsored bills is low, the vi-
ability of majority-sponsored bills is not necessarily very high.
Information distinguishing which majority-sponsored bills
are viable relative to other majority-sponsored bills should
therefore be valuable; because minority-party bills are less
viable regardless, additional information on their viability is
less valuable. Thus, I expect the association between inter-
est diversity and committee consideration to be stronger for
majority-sponsored bills than minority-sponsored bills.
Second, I consider institutional alignments among the cham-
bers of Congress and the White House. Divided government
makes it harder to pass legislation (Binder 1999; Kelly 1993).
This is because under divided government and ideological
sorting between the parties, the ideological distance between
pivotal voters across the stages of the legislative process tends
to increase (Krehbiel 1998). In such situations, information
that a bill can appeal to a wide range of legislators will be
more valuable for a policy-motivated committee chair. Thus,
Net Interest Diversity should be more strongly associated
with committee consideration during divided government
than during unified government.
To test these expectations, I reestimate the full model
specification (model 4 of fig. 1) on four subsamples of the data.
Per the discussion above, the subsamples constitute majority-
party bills only, minority-party bills only, bills introduced under
unified government only, and bills introduced during divided
government only. Of particular interest here is how the coeffi-
cient on Net Interest Diversity varies across these subsamples. If
committee chairs place greater value on information about leg-
islative viability when that viability is more ambiguous, then
one would expect that the coefficient on Net Interest Diversity
would be higher for bills introduced by majority-party mem-
bers than for minority-party members and higher for bills in-
troduced during periods of divided government than for uni-
fied government.
Table 1 presents, for each of these subsamples, the coef-
ficient estimates for the lobbying coalition attributes in the
full model specification (full results are in the appendix). The
association between Net Interest Diversity and committee con-
sideration is substantively stronger and statistically significant
for majority-party bills and bills introduced during divided
government but small and statistically indistinguishable from
zero for minority-party members’ bills and bills introduced
during unified government. For majority-party bills, a shift
from 1 standard deviation below mean Net Interest Diversity
to 1 standard deviation above Net Interest Diversity (with
other variables held at their subsample means) is associated
with a 14 percentage point increase in the probability of
committee consideration. For bills introduced during divided
government, the 2 standard deviation increase in Net Interest
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Diversity is associated with a 9 percentage point increase in
probability of committee consideration. For minority-party
bills and bills introduced during unified government, the same
increase in Net Interest Diversity is associated with lower
probability of consideration, by 0.6 and 6 percentage points,
respectively. However, these differences are both likely attrib-
utable to chance. These differences for Net Interest Diversity
across institutional factors contrast with Net PAC Contribu-
tions, which maintains a small and statistically nonsignificant
positive coefficient across all subsamples. The coefficients on
Net Side Size are negative and statistically significant for
majority-party bills and bills introduced under divided gov-
ernment and are imprecisely estimated for both minority-
party bills and bills introduced under unified government.
This reflects complexities, discussed above, in interpreting the
coefficient of Net Side Size and is subject to similar caveats.
These results are consistent with a primarily informa-
tional basis for the influence of interest-diverse lobbying coali-
tions. Neither distributional nor partisanmodels consider how
interest group influence might vary between majority- and
minority-sponsored legislation, nor do they predict differences
in interest group influence across unified and divided gov-
ernment. However, chairs have reasons to value information
about viability more highly for majority-party bills and bills
introduced during periods of divided government. Given that
such information can be provided by interest-diverse lobbying
coalitions, I expect that the association between Net Interest
Diversity and committee consideration will be stronger for
majority-party bills and bills introduced during divided gov-
ernment than for minority bills or bills introduced during
unified government. Results are consistentwith this expectation.
Together with the full sample analyses, these subsample analy-
ses show not only that lobbying, and particularly Net Inter-
est Diversity, is associated with committee agenda setting but
that it is more strongly associated with committee agenda setting
on bills when legislative viability is more ambiguous. To the
extent this indicates that interest-diverse coalitions are more
influential when the information they provide is more valuable,
these findings are consistent with the theory of prospective via-
bility as a source of interest group influence on committee
agendas.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I consider two questions: How do interest groups
influence lawmaking?Does a group need to bewell connected or
well resourced to be influential? Analyzing a large new data set of
interest groups’ positions on congressional legislation, I show
that lobbying coalitions influence the first and most drastic
legislative winnowing point in Congress: consideration in com-
mittee. Contrary to many previous accounts, I show that it is
neither large nor moneyed coalitions that have consistent in-
fluence in committee agenda setting. Rather, committee con-
sideration is associated with coalitions composed of organiza-
tions representing diverse industries, social causes, and other
interests. In addition, I document nonlinearities in the associa-
tion between interest-diverse coalitions and committee consid-
eration; the association is stronger for majority-party bills than
minority-party bills and stronger during divided government
Table 1. Associations between Coalition Attributes and Committee Consideration Change with Institutional Conditions
Subsample
Majority Minority Unified Government Divided Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net interest diversity .0384*** 2.00499 2.0169 .0319**
(.00973) (.0303) (.0310) (.00977)
Net PAC contributions .00559 .00673 .00327 .00551
(.00421) (.0149) (.0178) (.00419)
Net side size 2.0182*** 2.000953 .0145 2.0155***
(.00457) (.0123) (.0208) (.00434)
Random intercepts: major topic code .423** 1.357* .124 .509**
(.153) (.686) (.0959) (.182)
Sources of coalition diversity controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Institution and sponsor controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Congress fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
N 3,508 1,245 789 3,968
Note. Mixed effects logit models of committee consideration. Standard errors in parentheses. PACp political action committee. See full results in the appendix.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
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than during unified government. The cross-sectional nature of
the data inhibits causal inferences from any one of these results,
but collectively they are consistent with the theory that lobbying
helps chairs assess legislative viability and is more influential
when chairs place higher value on information about legislative
viability.
Thus, this article contrasts with and expands on previous
accounts of interest group influence. While interest group
research has focused on how interest groups make tactical
decisions and influence legislator behavior (see Hojnacki et al.
2012), and to a much lesser extent how they influence policy
outcomes (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Grossmann 2012a), this
study joins only a few others in examining how interest groups
influence legislative advancement. In doing so, it moves be-
yond other studies, which examine interest groups’ legislative
influence as a function of their numbers (Gilens and Page
2014; Grossmann and Pyle 2013) or their resources (Baum-
gartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015), to
identify an alternative source of interest group influence on
legislative advancement: interest diversity within lobbying
coalitions. Expanding on the work of Phinney (2017) and
others, this article shows that coalition diversity influences
not only legislative formulation but also legislative advance-
ment. While interest diversity may itself be an important an-
tecedent of influence, this article has broader implications
about how interest groups gain influence. What makes lob-
bying influential is not only its messages but its messengers. In
this case, lobbyists may or may not employ “informational”
strategies per se (e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright 1994), but
lobbying itself is informative because it clarifies the eco-
nomic and societal interests at stake in a given bill. Future
studies may examine other ways in which interest groups’, and
lobbyists’, identities influence policy makers’ decisions. An-
other contribution of this article is to show how interest groups
may be incorporated into theories of American political in-
stitutions. This article is one of the first analyses of how interest
group influence interacts with majority-party power and in-
stitutional alignments. Future studies could expand on this,
examining differences in how lobbying coalitions influence
various outcomes under different institutional contexts. In
addition, while this article’s finding that diverse coalitions
matter more for ambiguously viable bills suggests the kinds
of informational incentives emphasized by Krehbiel (1991),
it does not rule out that mechanisms derived from distribu-
tional or partisan theories condition interest group influence
through other lobbying coalition attributes not considered
here. Examining how institutional factors, such as those em-
phasized in theories of legislative organization, condition inter-
est group influence might not only provide further evidence
on conditions under which varying theories hold but also sug-
gest reforms that might indirectly encourage a more nor-
matively desirable role of organized interests in the policy
process.
In addition, this article has implications for how individ-
ual political actors pursue their goals within institutional
contexts. Models of bargaining, gridlock, and agenda control
(Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Cox andMcCubbins 2005; Krehbiel
1998) routinely assume that legislative actors can predict the
responses of other legislators to their actions. This article calls
this assumption into question. Instead, legislative actors such
as committee agenda setters may depend on environmental
cues to inform such predictions and, by extension, their sub-
sequent decisions. To the extent this is true, and lobbying
serves as such a cue, it suggests that lobbying’s influence goes
beyond individual pieces of legislation to shaping legislators’
perception of their political reality.
Perhaps more optimistically, this article shows that the
systemic effect of lobbying on lawmakingmay be of a different
character than is often believed. Individual organizations may
pursue narrow, parochial interests, which in turn compel their
legislator allies to champion those narrow interests. Even if
this is true, and legislators find compromise costlier, it actu-
ally incentivizes consensus-driven legislative agendas. Interest-
diverse lobbying coalitions allow legislative agenda setters to
more precisely identify bills that will garner broad support,
which in turn increases the likelihood that such bills will be
promoted onto the agenda in the first place.
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1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all variables used in either the main article or this appendix.
2
Variable Obs Mean/Prop Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Dependent Variable: Committee Consideration
Referred or Marked Up 4757 .289 GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Marked Up in Committee 4757 .268 GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Reported from Committee 4757 .267 GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Reported from Committee (CBP) 4757 .199 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Majority Party Priority Bill 4757 .060 Congress.gov
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Independent Variables: Interest Group Side Attributes
Net Interest Diversity 4757 3.405 9.331 -54 97 ML&CRP
(# of Unique Interests)
Net PAC Contributions 4757 3.334 14.461 -119.630 324.618 ML&CRP
($2.675mil)
Net Side Size 4757 6.739 22.685 -122 262 ML
(# Organizations )
Control Variables: Bill Context and Sponsor
Competitiveness 4757 -10.223 21.341 -262 0 ML
(-|#Supporters - #Opponents|)
Interest Group Salience 4757 13.583 26.807 1 524 ML
(# Organizations)
Legislator Salience 4757 31.249 50.135 0 380 GT
(# of Cosponsors)
Sponsor: Majority Party Member 4757 .737 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Sponsor: Committee Member 4757 .591 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Sponsor: Committee Chair 4757 .130 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Unified Government 4757 .166 CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Issue Breadth 4757 1.084 1.83 .036 40.34 GT
(% of Available Legislative Subject Codes)
Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for each of the continuous and count variables included in this
paper’s empiricalmodels. Data sources (and abbreviations) areMaplight.org ("ML"),Govtrack.us ("GT"),
Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets.org, "CRP"), the Congressional Bills Project ("CBP"), and
the Comparative Agendas Project ("CAP").
3
2 Full Results Tables
Table 2 reports full results for the models in Figure 1 of the main article text. Table 3 reports full results
for the subsample analyses presented in Table 1 of the main article text.
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(0.00829) (0.00844) (0.00868) (0.00890)
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(0.00383) (0.00399) (0.00395) (0.00414)

















































(0.136) (0.139) (0.152) (0.157)
Congress Fixed Effects? 3 3 3 3
N 4757 4757 4757 4757
AIC 5018.0 5223.7 4579.8 4558.8
BIC 5082.7 5301.3 4663.9 4662.3
Log Likelihood -2499.0 -2599.9 -2276.9 -2263.4
Wald χ2 (d.f.) 360.6 (8) 219.4 (10) 672.9 (11) 682.2 (14)
Table 2: Net InterestDiversity, Net PACContributions, andNet Side Size: Full Results fromFourModel
Specifications
Estimates of mixed effects logit models of committee consideration (Markup or Reporting). Standard
errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsample Majority Minority Unified Govt Divided Govt




(0.00973) (0.0303) (0.0310) (0.00977)
Net PAC Contributions 0.00559 0.00673 0.00327 0.00551
(0.00421) (0.0149) (0.0178) (0.00419)




(0.00457) (0.0123) (0.0208) (0.00434)









(0.00572) (0.0188) (0.0182) (0.00588)
# of Cosponsors -0.0000429 0.00100 -0.000685 -0.000125









































(0.188) (0.414) (0.799) (0.260)
Random Intercepts






(0.153) (0.686) (0.0959) (0.182)
N 3508 1245 789 3968
AIC 3835.6 696.3 878.9 3679.3
BIC 3921.8 757.8 939.6 3767.3
Table 3: Associations Between Coalition Attributes and Committee Consideration Change with
Institutional Conditions (Full Results)
Standard errors in parentheses. All models are mixed effects logit models.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
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3 Robustness: Alternative Measures of Committee Consideration
Committee consideration can be measured in many ways. In the paper, I measure consideration with an
indicator of whether a bill was either granted markup or reported to the full chamber (or both), taken
from the legislative tracking website Govtrack. This variable I designate Markup or Reporting. Here,
I show that the main results from the paper are robust to other potential measures of the dependent
variable.
The measures are as follows. For each bill, if any full committee in the bill’s chamber of origin
marked-up the bill, I recorded the bill as having received a Markup. Similarly, if any full committee
in the bill’s chamber of origin reported the bill, I recorded the bill as having received Reporting from
committee. Also, the CBP dataset contains information about committee bill reporting, which I use to
develop an alternative measure of whether a committee in the bill’s chamber of origin Reported (CBP)
the bill. The four variables that measure committee consideration – Markup (Govtrack), Reporting
(Govtrack),Markup or Reporting (Govtrack), andReported (CBP) – are highly correlated (the minimum
correlation between them is r = 0.72). Table 4 presents the coefficients for the full model specification
from themain paper on each of thesemeasures of committee consideration. Results are consistent across
all models.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Committee Consideration Markup or Report Markup Reporting Reported
Data Source Govtrack Govtrack Govtrack CBP








(0.00890) (0.00866) (0.00893) (0.0112)
Net PAC Contributions 0.00657 0.00317 0.00492 0.0115
(0.00405) (0.00391) (0.00403) (0.00610)








(0.00414) (0.00402) (0.00417) (0.00550)














(0.00513) (0.00488) (0.00482) (0.00561)
# of Cosponsors -0.000149 0.000714 -0.000153 -0.00132
(0.000748) (0.000738) (0.000756) (0.000884)








(0.218) (0.220) (0.229) (0.258)
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(0.247) (0.250) (0.253) (0.431)
Random Intercepts








(0.157) (0.161) (0.143) (0.171)
Congress Fixed Effects? 3 3 3 3
N 4757 4757 4757 4757
AIC 4558.8 4546.6 4476.0 3391.8
BIC 4662.3 4650.1 4579.5 3495.3
Table 4: Results are Robust to Measurement of Committee Consideration
Standard errors in parentheses. Each column presents the results of a mixed effects logit model with
major-topic code random intercepts.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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4 Lobbying’s Influence on House Majority Party Priority Bills
During theperiodof the study, 2005-2014, themajority party leadership in theU.S.House held significant
floor agenda power (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2001). In addition to keeping
majority-opposed bills off the floor agenda, party leaders could effectively force a bill onto the floor
agenda, even if it had not been fully vetted by the committee to which it was referred. Though it is
beyond the scope of a study on committee agenda-setting to fully consider such majority party priority
bills, knowing how interest groups influence their selection is informative. To this end, here I present the
results of a separate series of models of interest group influence on selection of majority party priority
legislation from amongmajority party bills. Majority priority bills can be identified in a number of ways,
but a telltale sign of such a bill in the House would be if a majority party bill has been prepared for (e.g.,
been given a specific rule by the House Rules Committee) or granted House floor consideration without
having been marked up or reported from a substantive committee.
To identify priority bills, I leverage the advanced functionality of the bill search engine on
www.congress.gov. Congress.gov allows users to specify "actionCodes" to subset bills that have received
(or have not received) a particular type of procedural action. There are many codes,
1
offering users the
ability to precisely identify bills subject to any of nearly 100 actions in the two chambers. Using this code, I
selected those that received "House preparation for the floor" or "House floor actions"without also having
received "House committee/subcommittee actions (including hearings and markups)". Congress.gov
identified 286 suchHouse majority party priority bills in the sample.
To examine the influence of interest group coalition attributes on such bills, I replicate the analyses
of Table 2 in the main article text, in which committee consideration was regressed on a series of sets
of right-hand side variables, including the three lobbying coalition attributes, as well as various sets of
control variables. I make twomodifications to these models here. First, I confine this analysis to majority
party House bills not receiving committee consideration, to ensure that I am comparingHouse majority
party priority bills only to other bills sponsored by House majority party members. Second, instead of
committee consideration, the dependent variable is an indicator of the bill was one of theHouse majority
party priority bills identified by the search described above. Thus, themodels compare lobbying coalition
attributes on House majority party priority bills to those on other bills introduced by House majority
party members that did not receive committee consideration.
Table 5 presents the results of this comparison. I find no difference in lobbying coalition attributes
between House majority party priority bills and other non-committee-considered bills sponsored by
members of the House majority party. This suggests that lobbying on majority party bills happens
after a legislative vehicle has been developed, introduced and advanced to the floor. Indeed, the recent
politics of Republicans’ attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act
2





Interested readers may wish to learn more about these codes at https://www.congress.gov/
help/action-search-scope-notes (accessedMarch 23rd, 2018).
2
Watkins, Eli. "Groups lining up in opposition toGOPhealth care plan,"CNN.com,March 9th, 2017.
Available at: https://cnn.it/2GpA9ik, accessedMarch 25th, 2018.
3
Tankersley, Jim, Thomas Kaplan and Kenneth P. Vogel. "Lobbying Frenzy Begins on Tax Bill",New
York Times, November 3rd, 2017. Available at: https://nyti.ms/2hDkIoZ, accessed March 25th,
2018.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Interest Diversity 0.0274 0.00189 0.0321 0.0216
(0.0207) (0.0200) (0.0209) (0.0223)
Net PAC Contributions -0.00953 -0.0121 -0.0125 -0.0138
(0.00994) (0.00905) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Net Side Size -0.00899 0.00177 -0.0106 -0.00371
(0.0105) (0.00938) (0.0104) (0.0105)
























Unified Government 1.257 1.280
(0.802) (0.804)




(0.698) (0.704) (0.226) (0.238)
Random Intercepts
Major Topic Code 0.173 0.189 0.126 0.136
(0.0942) (0.101) (0.0832) (0.0867)
N 1423 1423 1423 1423
AIC 1205.4 1169.1 1038.5 1031.2
BIC 1252.8 1232.2 1096.4 1104.9
Table 5: No Influence of Lobbying Coalition Attributes on Selection as a Majority Party Priority Bill
The dependent variable is whether a given bill is selected as aHouse majority party priority bill. Standard
errors in parentheses. Each column presents the results of a mixed effects logit model with major-topic
code random intercepts.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
10
5 Robustness: ExcludingMajority Party Priority Legislation
Majority party priority legislation systematically differs from other bills that do not receive committee
consideration. Where the former skip committees, the latter are neglected by committees. This
suggests that it would be appropriate to treat these two classes of non-committee-considered legislation
differently. In the previous section, I examined whether party-prioritized bills were more likely to receive
consideration. Here, I exclude them from the main models of my analysis (e.g., Table 2 of this Online
Appendix). Table 6 shows that the substantive implications of the results of the main analysis change
only slightly. The coefficient on Net Interest Diversity is generally larger than in the main analysis as
reported in the article. Where, in the main body of the article, the coefficient on Net PAC Contributions
was statistically significant in all model specifications except the Full Model, here the coefficient is even
smaller and is only statistically significant in the Base model specification. The coefficient on Net Side
Size is larger or smaller depending on model specification.
(1) (2) (3) (4)








(0.00861) (0.00878) (0.00921) (0.00943)
Net PAC Contributions 0.00970
∗
0.00724 0.00758 0.00426
(0.00384) (0.00389) (0.00421) (0.00424)








(0.00397) (0.00419) (0.00417) (0.00439)
Controls: Majority Party? 3 3 3 3
Controls: Causes of Coalition Diversity? 3 3
Controls: Causes of Consideration? 3 3
Congress Fixed Effects? 3 3 3 3
Major Topic Code Random Intercepts? 3 3 3 3
N 4471 4471 4471 4471
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 6: Results Do Not ChangeWhenMajority Priority Legislation is Excluded
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6 Robustness: High Demand Constituencies, Subject Breadth, and
Lobbying Coalition Influence
Adler and Lapinski (1997), Bishin (2009), Mayhew (1974), and others have explored how constituency
demands influence legislator behavior and legislative institutions. In particular, through their need to
serve highly active subsets of their constituencies, legislators are incentivized to support legislation serving
the needs to these "high demanders" (cf. Weingast and Marshall 1988). If appealing to a wide array of
high demand constituencies also creates interest diverse lobbying coalitions, then the association between
Net Interest Diversity and committee consideration may be spurious. If so, one might expect that that
association will be weaker (ormitigated entirely) if the relevance of a bill to "high demand constituencies"
is controlled for.
Thus, I reestimate the models controlling for the issue breadth of each bill. To measure this, I use
the Legislative Subject Terms assigned to each bill by the Congressional Research Service. The more of
these a bill has, the more topics on which it touches and, by extension, the number of "high demand
constituencies" it might be relevant to. Because the absolute number of legislative subject terms available
to CRS changed beginning in 2009 with the 111th Congress, I specifically control for the percentage of all
available legislative subject terms assigned to a a bill as a measure of that bill’s issue breadth. As I report in
Table 7, the full model’s results with respect to lobbying coalition attributes are robust to controlling for
this measure of bills’ issue breadth.
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(1)
Net Interest Diversity 0.0319
∗∗∗
(0.00892)
Net PAC Contributions 0.00683
(0.00405)
Net Side Size -0.0161
∗∗∗
(0.00417)
Percent of Available Legislative Subject Codes 0.0470
∗
(0.0207)






# of Cosponsors -0.0000576
(0.000748)
Minority Party, on Committee 1.309
∗∗∗
(0.218)
Majority Party, Not on Committee 1.274
∗∗∗
(0.200)



















Table 7: Broadly Relevant Bills Don’t Confound the Association Between Lobbying Coalitions and
Committee Consideration
The dependent variable is whether a given bill was granted committee consideration. Standard errors
in parentheses. Each column presents the results of a mixed effects logit model with major-topic code
random intercepts.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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7 Robustness: Different Assumptions About Error Structure
The results reported in the main article are from mixed effects logistic regression models, with Congress
fixed effects and Major Topic Code random intercepts. Here, I show that the article’s full model results
(Table 2, Model 4 of main article text) are robust to alternate modeling assumptions. The results of
several alternative models are reported in Table 8. Model 1 is a two-level random-intercept (Congress)
and random-coefficient (Unified Government) logit model, with Major Topic Code fixed effects. Model
2 is a logistic regression model with Congress and Major Topic Code fixed effects, with standard errors
clustered by a stemmed version of the bill’s long title. In addition to applying the Porter word stemming
algorithm to the long title, the stemmingprocedure removes years fromthe title aswell. Ofparticular note
here, the stemming procedure replaced specific years of 2000 or higher in a bill’s title with a generic "xxxx",
to allow for clustering together of bills that have the same title in eachCongress, but increment the year in
each successive Congress in which the bill is reintroduced (e.g., the hypothetical bills "The Legislative Act
of 2006" and "TheLegislativeAct of 2008"). Model 3 is a two-level random-intercept (StemmedBill Title)
logit model with Congress andMajor Topic Code fixed effects. Model 4 is a three-level random-intercept
(Stemmed Bill Title nested within Congress) and random coefficient (UnifiedGovernment by Congress)
logit model with Major Topic Code fixed effects. Results are substantively similar across all models.
(1) (2) (3) (4)








(0.00894) (0.0104) (0.0144) (0.0101)
Net PAC Contributions 0.00656 0.00653 0.00891 0.00676
(0.00406) (0.00477) (0.00635) (0.00434)








(0.00416) (0.00497) (0.00665) (0.00469)
All Controls? 3 3 3 3
Issue Area Fixed Effects? 3 3 3 3
Std. Errors Clustered by Bill Title? 3
Congress Fixed Effects? 3 3
Congress Random Intercepts? 3 3
åUnified Government Random Coefficients? 3 3
Stemmed Bill Title Random Intercepts? 3 3
åNestedWithin Congresses? 3
N 4752 4752 4752 4752
AIC 4530.0 4519.2 4464.6 4538.2
BIC 4737.0 4739.1 4690.9 4751.6
Table 8: Alternative Assumed Error Structures
Dependent variable is whether bill was granted committee consideration. Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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8 Robustness: Collinearity Between Net Side Size & Net Interest
Diversity
Given that each side of a bill cannot have interest diversity larger than its size, Net Interest Diversity and
Net Side Size are highly correlated (r = 0.87) and, thus, multicollinearity impacts coefficient estimates
when the two coalition attributes are included in the same model. In general, multicollinearity affects
model estimates in two ways. First, it can inflate coefficient estimates’ standard errors. To the extent
this affects results presented here, it suggests that the relationship between these coalition attributes and
committee consideration may be stronger (i.e., more statistically significant) than reported here. Second,
multicollinearity can cause instability inparameter estimates, resulting in estimates that switch signsbased
on model specification.
To assess how collinearity effects the coefficient estimates on Net Interest Diversity and Net Side
Size, I examine each in isolation from other lobbying coalition attributes. It should be noted that
doing so conflates coalitions’ interest diversity and size, contradicting the theory advanced here. Thus,
these models are biased against finding an association between Net Interest Diversity and committee
consideration. Nevertheless, the results from the more appropriate models presented in the main text
are largely robust to examining diversity and size in isolation. Table 9 reports the results of eight models
(four focusing on Net Interest Diversity and four on Net Side Size) analogous to those in Table 2 of the
main text. As in models including all lobbying coalition attributes, models of Net Interest Diversity in
isolation (Models 1-4) find its coefficient to be positive, though inModels 2 and 4 this is marginally more
likely to be due to chance.
Results for Net Side Size (Models 5-8) in isolation find its coefficient to be small across all
specifications. While it is positive and statistically significant in the base model (Model 5), the coefficient
is not statistically significant in other specifications and its sign varies depending on which controls are
added. This suggests that collinearity is affecting coefficient estimates forNet Side Size. However, because
Model 7 includes no other variables directly related interest group lobbying, it is unlikely that the main
text’s counterintuitive findings with respect to Net Side Size are purely due to collinearity among it
and Net Interest Diversity. Instead, these results imply that the association between Net Side Size and
committee consideration is both negligible and not robust to model specification.
Taken together, these results suggest that despite their theoretical distinctiveness, interest diversity
and size tend to move in tandem in most empirical contexts. This is intuitive, as lobbying coalitions
would increase diversity by adding newmembers. However, as discussed in the main text, coalitions may
increase the likelihood that they will be successful to the extent that the new members they add increase
the coalition’s interest diversity.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)








(0.00360) (0.00482) (0.00382) (0.00497)
Other Lobbying Coalition Attributes?
Controls: Majority Party? 3 3 3 3
Controls: Causes of Coalition Diversity? 3 3
Controls: Causes of Consideration? 3 3
Congress Fixed Effects? 3 3 3 3
Major Topic Code Random Intercepts? 3 3 3 3
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Net Side Size 0.003501
∗
-0.00235 0.00144 -0.00143
(0.00151) (0.00209) (0.00158) (0.00214)
Other Lobbying Coalition Attributes?
Controls: Majority Party? 3 3 3 3
Controls: Causes of Coalition Diversity? 3 3
Controls: Causes of Consideration? 3 3
Congress Fixed Effects? 3 3 3 3
Major Topic Code Random Effects? 3 3 3 3
Table 9: Net Interest Diversity and Net Side Size in Isolation
Results frommixed effects logistic regressions. Dependent variable is whether bill was granted committee
consideration. Standard errors in parentheses.
†p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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